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Professor Martha C. Nussbaum is an accomplished scholar 
in an impressive variety of fields. Drawing on her diverse aca-
demic backgrounds, Nussbaum has written extensively about 
emotions and their importance for law from the perspective of 
her primary specialty, philosophy.1 Her book Hiding from Hu-
manity criticizes the roles that two particular emotions, disgust 
and shame, play in the law.2 Its central thesis is that, as legal 
actors, we should be wary of disgust and shame because indulg-
ing in those emotions allows us to hide from our humanity—
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both our humanity in the general sense and also those specific 
features of our humanity that are most animalistic: our vulner-
ability and mortality.3 In 2004, the Association of American 
Publishers awarded Hiding from Humanity its Professional 
and Scholarly Publishing Award for Law.4 Many have praised 
it,5 while others have been more critical.6 In light of the broad 
range of fields that Nussbaum draws upon in Hiding from Hu-
manity, the book has predictably spawned much interesting 
discussion and commentary by law professors,7 literary schol-
ars,8 philosophers,9 political scientists,10 and the media.11 
Our unique contribution to this lively discourse surround-
ing Hiding from Humanity is an analysis of Nussbaum’s argu-
ment from the perspective of recent advances in research about 
emotions, happiness, and well-being made by economists,12 le-
gal academics,13 negotiation scholars,14 neuroscientists,15 and 
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psychologists.16 We share Nussbaum’s interest in how affect, 
emotions, and moods influence decision making,17 decision 
avoidance,18 and judgment.19 One of us has analyzed psycho-
logical game-theoretic models to examine the role of guilt in 
upholding social norms and organizational cultures;20 parental 
choices regarding reproductive genetic technologies;21 fiduciary 
duties and trust in corporate and securities law;22 and the in-
fluence of shame on bargaining over property rights23 and com-
pliance with international environmental law.24 The other has 
analyzed how to predict and normatively evaluate the inaction 
of individuals presented with opportunities that could benefit 
them, and with opportunities to help alleviate great human suf-
fering, such as genocide and poverty.25 
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We concur with many of Nussbaum’s conclusions and find 
much to admire in her scholarship and in Hiding from Human-
ity in particular. Yet even though Nussbaum drew from many 
disciplines in Hiding from Humanity, she left other potentially 
fertile fields, such as neuroscience, untouched. In addition, de-
spite the book’s recent publication date, a number of subse-
quent developments have occurred in affective, cognitive, and 
social neuroscience;26 dispute resolution;27 economics;28 affec-
tive psychology;29 and positive psychology.30 These develop-
ments have not gone unnoticed by other academics. For exam-
ple, two negotiation scholars, Professor Roger Fisher, who is 
known for coauthoring a landmark book about negotiation,31 
and Professor Daniel Shapiro, who is associate director of the 
Harvard Negotiation Project,32 recently observed that “strong 
emotions serve a useful function. You do not want to ignore 
emotions and lose their energy and information.”33 Other ex-
amples of advances in recent scholarly understanding about 
emotions that are relevant to Nussbaum’s thesis are experi-
mental studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to examine the neural bases of decision making and 
moral judgment, including many by her cousin, Joshua 
Greene.34 Cognitive neuroscientist Elizabeth Phelps and social 
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psychologist Mahzarin Banaji have used fMRI to link people’s 
brain activity to the way they evaluate racial groups.35 Other 
studies provide fMRI evidence that social exclusion activates 
the same brain regions as feeling physical sensations of pain.36 
Our contribution is to reassess Nussbaum’s arguments in light 
of these research developments. 
Our analysis of Hiding from Humanity is organized as fol-
lows. We first provide an overview of the interactions of emo-
tions, psychology, and laws. Next, we analyze the roles that re-
vulsion can and should play in law. We then examine the roles 
that saving and losing “face” can and should play in law. Our 
fourth section speculates about the constructive role that posi-
tive and negative emotions may play in law, to respond to 
Nussbaum’s argument that two negative emotions, disgust and 
shame, threaten to disrupt the functioning of the legal system. 
Finally, our conclusion offers ideas for future research based on 
the foundation suggested by Hiding from Humanity. 
I.  PSYCHOLOGY, EMOTIONS, AND THE LAW 
A number of scholars from such diverse fields and perspec-
tives as anthropology,37 economics,38 history,39 neuroscience,40 
 
Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); Joshua Greene, 
Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE INNATE 
MIND  338  (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2005); Joshua Greene & Jonathan 
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How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 
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NEUROSCIENCE: PEOPLE THINKING ABOUT PEOPLE 167, 181–82 (John T. Ca-
cioppo et al. eds., 2006). 
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philosophy,41 psychology,42 and sociology,43 are (re)discovering 
emotions. American psychology, for example, largely avoided 
the use of certain emotions as constructs for much of the twen-
tieth century44 while under the influence of the philosophy of 
positivism.45 Since then, mental constructs have emerged 
within cognitive science,46 paving the way for the study of emo-
tions. Emotions promise to play an important role in twenty-
first century psychology; the American Psychological Associa-
tion has founded a new journal47 dedicated to the study of emo-
tion, other new journals specializing in emotion-related articles 
have emerged,48 and we have noticed a trend towards estab-
lished psychology journals publishing more articles about emo-
tions. 
Many legal scholars have also turned their attention to the 
roles that emotions can play in formulating legal thought, prac-
tice, and principles.49 One example of such scholarship is Hid-
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literature search for the terms “anger,” “disgust,” and “fear” in the PsychInfo 
reference database from 1960 through 2003). There are few citations referenc-
ing any of the terms through 1964; then fear shows a linear increase in refer-
ences through the present, anger follows with a parallel linear increase begin-
ning in 1981, and disgust shows a relatively miniscule increase starting in the 
late 1990s). Id. 
  45. See,  e.g., AUGUSTE COMTE, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY 
(Frederick Ferré ed., Paul Descours & H. Gordon Jones trans., revised by Fre-
derick Ferré, 1970) (1905). 
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  49. See,  e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Kathryn 
Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1602 (2002); Susan Ban-
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361 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An 
Empirical Test With Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
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12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992); Laura Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the 
Federal Judiciary, 44 AM.  U.  L.  REV. 699 (1995); Jules Lobel & George HUANG & ANDERSON_3FMT 03/13/2006 02:29:43 PM 
2006]  EMOTIONAL LEGAL DECISION MAKING  1051 
 
ing from Humanity, which takes as its foundation a number of 
hypothesized connections between emotion and law.50 On the 
surface, psychology—the origin of much research on emotion—
and law appear to be rather different fields. For the empirical 
psychologist, however, the law can be seen as a domain of hu-
man behavior, albeit a complex one in terms of the number and 
variety of actors and motivations that influence behaviors and 
outcomes. The trend in recognizing this connection between the 
fields is evidenced by notable works in psychology that treat le-
gal actors, such as jurors, as the focus of empirical analysis.51 
To legal scholars and philosophers such as Nussbaum, psycho-
logical analysis represents an avenue for scrutinizing the basis 
of law and for questioning our assumptions about the origins 
and functions of law. 
Nussbaum is most compelling when she contends that our 
system of law cannot be understood without some reference to 
emotions, which indicate what is important to those persons 
the law should protect.52 Nussbaum portrays emotions and 
vulnerability as fundamentally intertwined, and interprets 
laws as defenses against human vulnerability to a wide variety 
of harms.53 This portrayal of emotion is more helpful than com-
peting interpretations that focus on debatable elements that 
only apply to some emotions in some contexts.54 Nussbaum 
convincingly portrays vulnerability as a necessary condition for 
 
Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in For-
eign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005); Toni 
Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 
(1991); Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, 
supra, at 80; Toni Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal 
Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645 (1997); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth 
V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 (1988); Samuel Pills-
bury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 1977 (2001). 
  50. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 5–12. 
  51. See,  e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDG-
ING THE JURY (2001); REID HASTIE, INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUROR DECISION MAKING (1994). 
  52. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
  53. Id. at 6–7. 
  54. See,  e.g., NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 69–71 (1987) (providing an 
often-cited definition of emotions as states of “action readiness”). But see 
Anderson, supra note 18, at 162 (pointing out that decision conflict and emo-
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emotion,55 and thus provides a strong case for seeing the legal 
field, which provides protection from, and recourse for, 
breached vulnerabilities, as being intimately tied to the human 
experience of emotion. 
Nussbaum argues that the emotions of those deciding cases 
and making the law impact the law by acting as a variable on 
the perceived seriousness or wrongness of an offense, and more 
importantly, by influencing which acts a society deems neces-
sary to curtail, outlaw, or punish.56 Nussbaum’s arguments, 
valuable as they are, strike an odd chord with the rest of Hid-
ing from Humanity. Whereas this part of her argument gives 
strong reasons for both the descriptive and normative relevance 
of emotion to the law, the remainder of Hiding from Humanity 
is devoted to criticizing two specific emotions, disgust and 
shame, for their perceived role in law.57 There may be reasons 
why some emotions are relevant while others are not. For ex-
ample, Nussbaum hypothesizes that the cognitive content of 
disgust does not include beliefs about harm. Cognitive content 
involving experienced harms are, in her view, necessary for 
pertinence to the law, whereas emotions experienced in the ab-
sence of real harm are not appropriate for consideration in a le-
gal forum.58 
While the relevance of some emotions but not others is de-
batable, it nonetheless seems odd to begin by discussing the 
relevance of emotion to law when constructing an argument for 
the irrelevance of two emotions to law. For this reason we have 
chosen specifically to highlight some positive, constructive in-
terfaces between law and emotion in our fourth section after we 
analyze the main theme of Hiding from Humanity, which is the 
role that revulsion and saving face can and should play in our 
legal system. 
II.  REVULSION AND DISGUST 
Nussbaum states that “[d]isgust appears to be an espe-
cially visceral emotion” and cites psychologist Paul Rozin’s 
 
  55. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
  56. Id. at 19–56. 
  57. Id. at 71–350. 
  58. See E-mail from Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Ser-
vice Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago Law School, to Peter 
Huang, Member, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, and 
Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law, 
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definition of disgust as involving revulsion at its core.59 Nuss-
baum finds disgust “unworthy of guiding public action” and “a 
dangerous social sentiment.”60 Does this mean it can never be 
proper to impose legal sanctions on the basis of revulsion or 
disgust? Should laws, and those involved in making and inter-
preting them, ever consider revulsion or disgust? 
A. THE RESEARCH 
One theoretical approach predicts, and experimental evi-
dence confirms, that once certain emotions are triggered in a 
particular situation, those emotions will continue to change 
risk estimates and behavior toward risk in situations unrelated 
to the original triggering context.61 In particular, anger, once it 
is triggered in a specific situation, will evoke more optimistic 
risk estimates and more risk-seeking behavior in other unre-
lated situations; fear causes the opposite pair of effects.62 Simi-
larly, a recent experimental study demonstrated that disgust 
induced by irrelevant, prior situations will carry over to norma-
tively unrelated decisions and reduce how much buyers are 
willing to pay for an item and how much sellers are willing to 
accept for that same item.63 
Experimentally-induced disgust has also been shown to 
persist beyond initial eliciting situations and to powerfully im-
pact subsequent cognition and behavior. One recent and highly 
relevant experimental study provides the first demonstration 
that augmenting disgust carries over to moral judgments.64 
This research suggests that individuals and lawmakers will 
find it challenging to contain disgust and that existing law 
might reflect such a struggle. 
 
 59.  HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 87. 
  60. Id. at 171. 
  61. See,  e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: To-
ward A Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 
COGNITION & EMOTION 473, 476–80 (2000) (presenting an appraisal-tendency 
theory of emotions). 
  62. See  Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived 
Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 144, 144 
(2003) (presenting supporting experimental evidence); Jennifer S. Lerner & 
Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
146, 146 (2001) (same). 
  63. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carry-
over Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 337, 340 
(2004). 
  64. See Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes 
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B. THE VALUE OF DISGUST TO THE LAW 
Hiding from Humanity takes the strong position that dis-
gust is never constructive in law, and in those cases where it 
might seem to be useful, indignation is actually the appropri-
ate, constructive emotion.65 Nussbaum reviews a variety of ac-
tors with varying ideological perspectives that support the role 
of disgust in legal decision making.66 Not surprisingly, several 
of these positions are conservative. Lord Patrick Devlin sug-
gests that society has a rightful desire for self-preservation, 
and monitoring and responding to its constituency’s disgust is 
central to that preservation.67 Another position, held by the 
former chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics, Pro-
fessor Leon R. Kass,68 sees an ambiguous “wisdom” in disgust 
that transcends reason.69 These positions are difficult to agree 
with, since the first, or both taken together, are a recipe for 
constructing a closed society.70 However, liberals and progres-
sives have also discussed the value of disgust. For example, 
criminal law professor Dan M. Kahan argues that disgust is a 
useful tool for steadfast and potent condemnations of cruelty, 
such as transgressions of human rights.71  
Arguments in favor of disgust’s role in legal decision mak-
ing must be analyzed carefully, for rejection of them is at the 
heart of Hiding from Humanity’s argument. Nussbaum por-
trays each of these arguments as fundamentally different, save 
for their agreement that disgust is relevant to law as more than 
a nuisance harm72 to individuals.73 We suggest they have more 
in common: for one, condemning cruelty is arguably part of the 
“wisdom” of disgust and one of the defining values a society 
through its shared notions of disgust may seek to promote. To 
the extent that an individual shares the values of her society, 
 
  65. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 75. Nussbaum defines 
“indignation” as anger triggered by unfairness. Id. 
  66. Id. at 75–87. 
  67. See  PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959). 
  68. See The President’s Council on Bioethics: Leon R. Kass, M.D., 
http://www.bioethics.gov/about/kass.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006). 
 69.  HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 79. 
 70.  Although  Hiding from Humanity portrays this as a conservative ar-
gument, it can and has been used across the political spectrum. See, e.g., Rich-
ard M. Ebeling, Political Correctness and the Closed Society, FREEDOM DAILY, 
Jun. 1992, available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/0692b.asp. 
  71. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 84. 
  72.  That is, based on an unpleasant mental or physiological experience. 
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that individual will arguably welcome any emotion that would 
promote goals associated with those values, and underpin legal 
decisions that support those values. Thus, although people of 
varying political affiliations might define cruelty differently, 
they all might agree that certain cruel acts are disgusting; a 
shared disgust with those acts is a potentially relevant indica-
tor that the acts should be abolished. 
The core of Hiding from Humanity’s normative argument 
against basing law on disgust is twofold: (1) we cannot trust 
disgust to carry innate wisdom or any meaningful correlation to 
what is really harmful,74 and (2) disgust prompts turning away 
from a stimulus or issue rather than constructively handling 
it.75 Nussbaum convincingly wins the first point by citing a 
great deal of psychological research that shows how disgust can 
be transferred to irrelevant objects or persons in a process 
called “psychological contamination.”76 Through this process, 
noncontaminated, nonharmful persons come to be seen as dis-
gusting by their similarity to, contact with, or manipulative as-
sociation with a primary disgusting object. While these people 
cause no harm, a society can come to see them as dangerous, 
and in the process, the disgust-seer can become a real source of 
harm in response to an imagined source of harm. This is a 
compelling argument, and Nussbaum gives many historical and 
current examples of the process, including the subordination of 
women77 and Jewish persons.78 However, this argument alone 
is insufficient to convince the rea d e r  t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
purge disgust from legal and social thinking. We draw a differ-
ent conclusion from the same information, which is that before 
disgust can be potentially useful, it must be actively managed. 
Determinations of what is found disgusting and why must be 
made.  
Nussbaum’s second argument is that because disgust is 
rooted in fear of contamination, it motivates the disgusted per-
son to get away from what is disgusting as soon as possible.79 
Although Nussbaum places a great deal of emphasis on social 
disgust, disgust’s primary content is toward nonhuman objects, 
 
  74. Id. at 91–93. 
  75. Id. at 105. 
  76. Id. at 93–96. 
  77. Id. at 117–20. 
  78. Id. at 108–14. 
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which is also relevant to the law.80 People respond to disgust by 
distancing themselves from the object. In Nussbaum’s view, 
this “out of sight, out of mind” reflex undermines the ability to 
productively use disgust in fighting for progressive causes such 
as human rights. This is an oversimplification, and at least in 
some cases, personal experience discredits this. For example, 
disgusting images from the genocide in Rwanda motivate some 
to turn away from the information and avoid learning more 
about it, which in turn prevents them from actively working to 
prevent future crimes against humanity. For others, the images 
are seared into the memory, and they are thereby motivated to 
support the prevention of such crimes.81 This second response 
might also be seen as “turning away” from what is disgusting, 
but it entails a different kind of turning away that requires see-
ing one’s own inaction and passive bystanding82 as complicit in 
producing the disgusting image. 
Distancing can have the positive effect of causing one to 
separate from a group of perpetrators with which one is com-
plicit. Distancing is also productive when the disgust is in rela-
tion to risky, nonhuman sources of disgust, such as animal or 
other carriers of viruses or disease. Where people have a ten-
dency to be attracted to something that spreads disease, dis-
gust could be used to motivate legislation. For instance, the 
AIDS virus can be spread through dirty IV needles re-used by 
illegal IV drug users. The drug users do not have sufficient dis-
gust with the dirty needle to overcome their attraction to drugs, 
and it is illegal to supply clean needles to these persons. People 
should find it disgusting that a person is forced to use a dirty 
IV needle when a clean one could be provided, thereby reducing 
the AIDS virus transmission risk. Distancing oneself from the 
disgust of this image could mean not thinking or caring about 
endangered drug users, or it could prompt action to address the 
barriers the law has erected between the clean needle and the 
drug user. Hiding from Humanity does not consider the multi-
 
  80. See Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon, A Perspective on Disgust, 94 PSY-
CHOL. REV. 23, 27–29 (1987). 
  81. See,  e.g., Paul Slovic, Mass Murder: Why Do We Ignore It? (Nov. 14, 
2005) (unpublished slides presented as part of the speech, Paul Slovic, Address 
at the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (Nov. 14, 2005), on file with 
authors) (proposing that people ignore genocide in part because available in-
formation fails to convey meaningful affect and emotions). 
  82. See  generally  ERVIN  STAUB,  THE  PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL: 
WHY CHILDREN, ADULTS, AND GROUPS HELP AND HARM OTHERS (2003) (dis-
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ple forms of “turning away,” and thus may underestimate the 
usefulness of disgust. More behavioral research is required to 
understand the possible responses to disgust and the personal 
and contextual factors that determine them before a definitive 
stance is taken on Nussbaum’s argument. 
C. ELIMINATING DISGUST FROM THE LAW 
Given disgust’s status as a basic human emotion,83 it is 
unlikely that it could ever be completely extirpated from soci-
ety. The question that remains, and the position Nussbaum ad-
vocates,84 is whether disgust can be eliminated from legal deci-
sion making. 
The presence of shared notions of disgust in a society will 
continually put pressure on legislators, jurors, lawyers, and 
judges to incorporate those notions into law. In our view, for 
the antidisgust in law position to become successful, a society 
would have to become “disgusted with disgust,” which is to view 
it as an emotion too contaminated to be considered in impor-
tant decisions. Society would need to be persuaded that disgust 
is a fundamentally damaging emotion and that it promotes 
vulnerability instead of preventing it. This change requires a 
broad—perhaps impossibly broad—social consensus. While be-
coming “disgusted with disgust” might seem to be a contradic-
tory notion, Hiding from Humanity takes a first step toward 
persuading society to that position by illustrating several un-
pleasant uses of disgust in the law that many will likely find 
reprehensible, such as the subordination and extermination of 
Jews during World War II.85 Relating “disgust with disgust” to 
larger segments of the population is a worthwhile challenge 
that, if Nussbaum and her readers are serious about their posi-
tion, we should soon see attempts to tackle. 
It will, however, be difficult to convince society that it 
should feel “disgust with disgust.” As humans, “we are all built 
with a pair of related emotions—disgust and elevation 
.  .  .  .  [P]eople, or cultures, seem predisposed (though not pre-
ordained) to interpret their social worlds in terms of a vertical 
dimension in which divinity, virtue, and physical purity are up, 
 
  83. See Rozin & Fallon, supra note 80, at 23. 
  84. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 75. But cf. id. at 120–22 
(suggesting that a disgust-free society may not be an ideal norm given dis-
gust’s value and beneficial role in certain aspects of life and thought). 
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and bestiality, vice, and physical pollution are down.”86 Re-
search by psychology professor Jonathan Haidt and his col-
leagues provides evidence across contexts and cultures that 
human beings find it easy to link together divinity, morality, 
and physical purity.87 Thus, it can be quite natural for people to 
be convinced that they should feel disgust, even if that disgust 
is based upon phantom or unjustified associations. It might be 
possible to convince people that they should experience disgust 
about disgust. But a far more difficult endeavor would be to 
convince people to actually feel disgust about disgust. This dif-
ficulty relates to the fact that disgust, like many emotions, is 
usually automatic and unconscious.88 Nussbaum does not ad-
dress this feature of the emotion. 
One of the reasons why Hiding from Humanity takes such 
a strong line on disgust is that Nussbaum views disgust as an 
inherently hierarchical emotion.89 However, it might better be 
thought of as inherently categorical. For disgust to be hierar-
chical, one must see social disgust as the core of disgust, which 
it is not; social disgust is a relatively late-occurring generaliza-
tion of disgust. Because disgust categorizes the world into con-
taminated and uncontaminated objects and persons, it moti-
vates actors to avoid potentially contaminated objects and 
persons. This in turn creates a sort of hierarchy when applied 
to persons if one conflates avoidance with low status, which is 
not completely correct.90 Even if one were to grant that disgust 
 
  86.  Jonathan Haidt & Sara Algoe, Moral Amplification and the Emotions 
that Attach Us to Saints and Demons, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL EXIS-
TENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 322, 329 (Jeff Greenberg et al. eds., 2004). 
  87. See HAIDT, supra note 16, at 181–212; Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, 
Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 613 (1993); Jonathan Haidt et al., Body, Psyche, and Culture: 
The Relationship Between Disgust and Morality, 9 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING 
SOCIETIES 107 (1997); Jonathan Haidt, Elevation and the Positive Psychology 
of Morality,  in F LOURISHING:  POSITIVE  PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LIFE  WELL-
LIVED 275 (Corey L. M. Keyes & Jonathan Haidt eds., 2003); Jonathan Haidt 
& Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conser-
vatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  191 (2001); Jonathan 
Haidt,  The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Ap-
proach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001). 
  88. See,  e.g., TIMOTHY  D.  WILSON,  STRANGERS TO OURSELVES  117–35 
(2002). 
  89. See E-Mail from Martha Nussbaum to Peter Huang, supra note 58. 
  90.  In most species, dominant individuals are the most avoided. See Jo-
seph Henrich & Francisco J. Gil-White, The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Con-
ferred Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural 
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is inherently hierarchical, for most citizens this would not be 
viewed as a problematic element of its role in law. This is be-
cause most societies’ concept of complete morality includes a 
concern for preserving respect for a hierarchy and displaying 
behaviors that are appropriate to one’s place in a hierarchy.91 
Social psychologist, Susan Fiske, has constructed a stereo-
type content model of emotional prejudices, including contempt 
or disgust.92 Fiske’s research suggests that disgust and other 
emotional prejudicial reactions are immediate and not neces-
sarily conscious.93 Fiske’s recent neuroscientific research utiliz-
ing fMRI techniques finds that categorizing people to be inter-
changeable members of some outgroup promotes one response 
in an almond-shaped brain region known as the amygdala, 
which is associated with vigilance and alarm, and another re-
sponse in a different brain region known as the insula, which is 
characteristic of disgust or arousal, depending on social con-
text.94 Utilizing methods of cognitive and social neuroscience, 
Fiske’s research shows that emotional prejudices, including 
disgust, are not inevitable, but depend on one’s cognitive and 
social goals.95 In other words, even though disgust is not neces-
sarily conscious, it is not inevitable because it depends on a 
person’s thoughts and social motivations. 
Fiske has conducted research that demonstrates not only 
how and why emotional prejudice can occur, but also how and 
why particular social contexts can discourage prejudice.96 
Fiske’s research finds that people easily categorize others, es-
 
  91. See Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: 
Emotions and Intuitions Related to Ingroup, Hierarchy, and Purity, 19 SOC. 
JUST. RES. (forthcoming 2006). 
  92. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: 
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Com-
petition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878 (2002). 
  93. See Jamie Chamberlin, What’s Behind Prejudice?, MONITOR ON PSY-
CHOL., Oct. 2004, at 34. 
  94. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prison-
ers, 306 SCIENCE 1482, 1482 (2004). 
  95. See,  e.g., Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial 
Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 
16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 102 (2005). See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging 
Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005) (reviewing developing literature apply-
ing neuroscientific tools in examining social psychological responses to race). 
  96. See  SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2004); Susan T. Fiske, What We Know Now About Bias 
and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
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pecially based upon observable indices such as their age, gen-
der, and race.97 Individuals require motivation to get past such 
categorization in order to learn about others.98 Fiske’s labora-
tory studies demonstrate that depending on another individual 
or being a team member with someone motivates us to get past 
our stereotyping.99 Another experimental study by Fiske dem-
onstrates that competition sometimes causes individuation, be-
cause each person is motivated to learn how others act.100  
Thus, Fiske’s research suggests that antidiscrimination 
laws can mitigate prejudice by creating social contexts that fos-
ter cooperation, which in turn leads to individuation, rather 
than stereotypical attitudes of disgust. Fiske’s research also 
suggests that affirmative action in higher education and em-
ployment might combat discrimination, but only insofar as it 
places individuals on a common team, rather than in competi-
tion with each other for grades, promotions, and other posi-
tional goods.101 
III.  SAVING FACE AND LOSING IT 
Nussbaum takes great care in differentiating shame from 
disgust, guilt, depression, embarrassment, humiliation, and 
rage.102 As Nussbaum points out, shame is revealed in one’s 
face by blushing.103 A famous sociologist who is well-known for 
analyzing human interaction, Erving Goffman, utilized the no-
tion of “face” to explain how Americans manage their public 
image and social presentations.104 Nussbaum argues in Hiding 
 
  97. See  Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,  in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1998). 
  98. See Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought 
and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 122 
(2004). 
  99. See  Susan T. Fiske, Interdependence and the Reduction of Prejudice, in 
REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 115 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000). 
  100. See Janet B. Ruscher & Susan T. Fiske, Interpersonal Competition 
Can Cause Individuating Processes, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 832, 
837 (1990). 
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HEALTH AND LONGEVITY 92–95 (2004). 
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from Humanity that shame is an improper, inappropriate, and 
unreliable basis for law, especially with respect to punishment 
in criminal law.105 
A. CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN THE 
EXPERIENCE OF SHAME 
Some people can feel shame in unintended and undesired 
ways, even from noncriminal regulations. For example, Profes-
sors George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue observed that 
while food labeling has clear nutritional information benefits, 
such disclosures can foster a guilt-ridden, neurotic, shameful, 
and psychologically unhealthy perspective towards eating.106 
However, feelings of shame related to obesity vary not only 
across individuals, but also across cultures. Two economists 
from the Brookings Institution, Carol Graham and Andrew Fel-
ton, recently identified a statistically negative relationship be-
tween obesity and self-reported happiness in the U.S., but a 
positive correlation between obesity and self-reported happi-
ness in Russia.107 Nussbaum’s criticisms about disgust and 
shame in law are directed at cultures generally, and address 
“widespread social attitudes, influential in many times and 
places  .  .  .  [that] are currently enjoying renewed attention in 
contemporary American culture.”108 
Recent empirical, experimental, and field work by anthro-
pologists,109 psychologists,110 and others has found many ways 
in which the experience and use of emotions in daily life and 
social institutions varies across cultures. There is also recent 
 
SPOILED IDENTITY (1968); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); Erving Goffman, Embarrassment and Social Organiza-
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Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, 18 PSYCHIATRY 213 (1955).  
  105. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 13–16. 
  106. See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the 
Easy Way or the Hard Way”: Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2006). 
  107. See Carol Graham & Andrew Felton, Variance in Obesity Across Co-
horts and Countries: A Norms Based Explanation Using Happiness Surveys 
(The Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Soc. and Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 42, 
2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/dynamics/papers/CSED_wp42 
.pdf. 
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evidence that individuals process information differently in re-
sponse to emotional advertisements, due to the motivational 
and cognitive changes associated with age.111 One study pro-
poses that anxiety explains the difference in social risk percep-
tions across gender and race.112 This cultural and demographic 
heterogeneity in emotional responses means that people are 
likely to experience shame in legal situations in qualitatively 
and quantitatively different ways. A sociologist recently found 
that the presence and amount of shame experienced from seek-
ing legal remedies varies across cultures, which helps explain 
why the ethnic Chinese and Korean in Aotearoa New Zealand 
make little use of antidiscrimination law as compared to Pacific 
Island peoples and Indians.113 
Nussbaum notes that while shame varies across cultures, 
it also has similarities.114 The concept of “face” originated in 
Chinese thought and is a literal translation of two Chinese 
characters—lien and mien-tzu—which Chinese scholars differ-
entiate analytically,115 but whose meanings are interchange-
able in many verbal settings.116 People in particular contexts or 
situations can gain or lose face, but “[t]he mechanics of gaining 
face are different from those of losing it, and the two processes 
do not carry the same social implications.”117 Scholars have 
suggested that in Asian cultures, losing face leads to “a diminu-
tion of standing in society”118 and contributes to shame, which 
“often persists like a psychic scar.”119 Shame and hierarchy are 




  111. See Patti Williams & Aimee Drolet, Age-Related Differences in Re-
sponses to Emotional Advertisements, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (2005). 
  112. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The In-
fluence of Cultural Status Anxiety, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forth-
coming 2006) (proposing cultural status anxiety to explain the “white male ef-
fect”). 
  113. See Catherine Lane West-Newman, Feeling for Justice? Rights, Laws, 
and Cultural Contexts, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 323–30 (2005). 
  114. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 185–86. 
  115. See Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of “Face,” 46 AM. ANTHRO-
POLOGIST 45 (1944). 
  116. See David Yau-fai Ho, On the Concept of Face, 81 AM. J. SOC. 867, 868 
(1976). 
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other cultures.120 “Because Chinese social behavior is framed in 
terms of mutual dependence, social face, read as social ade-
quacy, is maintained relative to social position.”121 There are 
distributions in the severity and range of losing face that ex-
tend “from temporary and only in a circumscribed area of social 
life to permanent and irreversible” loss,122 which casts doubt 
over an individual’s “fitness as an acceptable member of soci-
ety.”123 These distributions of shame are not constant across 
cultures or over time because “judgments concerning the ex-
tent, loss, or gain of face are based on sets of criteria or stan-
dards which vary both cross-culturally and over time within a 
single culture.”124 
B. SHAME’S POWER AND LIMITATIONS 
In Asian societies particularly, people’s relationship to 
“face” “exerts a mutually restrictive, even coercive, power upon 
each member of the social network”125 because “the expecta-
tions of others significantly influence how individuals decide to 
act.”126 In fact, “[t]he actions of one person can affect the face of 
another connected with her”127 to such a degree that in tradi-
tional Chinese society “the individual’s face and the good name 
of his family (his chia sheng) were virtually inseparable.”128 
Similar notions of shame by association exist in such other 
Asian cultures as the Japanese,129 Korean,130 and Singapor-
ean.131 Contemporary scholars report that even when Asian 
parents have migrated to Western nations, they still teach   
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their children the concept and significance of face.132 One of us 
experienced parental “shame sharing” first-hand and power-
fully in childhood.133 
Of course, shame can become dysfunctional for those peo-
ple who are traumatized by shaming as youths.134 Some par-
ents undoubtedly rely on shaming techniques as convenient 
methods to discipline or raise their children.135 Such use of 
shame is suboptimal,136 both for children and society, if those 
children must learn in adulthood to recover from trauma in-
flicted by shame.137 However, while shame can do much dam-
age,138 it does not follow that shame can, should, or will have no 
constructive role to play in human interactions. For instance, 
anticipating feeling ashamed can motivate some children—and 
even adults—to avoid certain behaviors, some of which involve 
causing harm to others. In other words, shame can facilitate 
self-control or a first-party system of social control.139 
Shame can spill over onto family members and close 
friends of those who are shamed. Such spillovers might produce 
desirable incentives for those close to a target of shame to in-
fluence a target’s behavior via familial or social pressure. Al-
ternatively, emotional spillovers might have the negative con-
sequence of generating shame without corresponding de-
terrence benefits. Indeed, intended targets of shame might 
come to develop immunity to shaming because people adapt 
generally and quickly to emotions and feelings.140 For example, 
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some criminals might develop new family and friends consist-
ing of fellow criminals or members of a common gang, united by 
a shared, perverse sense of pride in their criminality and lack 
of morality.141 When this happens, shame no longer effectively 
deters criminal behavior. 
One novel theoretical economic model of shame investi-
gates the deterrent effects of shaming penalties.142 Its authors 
demonstrate an inverse relationship may exist between the 
rate of shaming penalties and their deterrent effects.143 The 
more that people are shamed, the less effective shaming penal-
ties become. In particular, the authors prove that increasing 
the size of shaming penalties does not necessarily increase, and 
in fact can even decrease, the deterrent effects of shaming pen-
alties, because the stigma of those penalties decreases as more 
people are subjected to them.144 In this model, the same is true 
for increasing the probability of detection or the accuracy of the 
judicial process.145 All of these results are based upon a formal 
model in which the costs of searching for law-abiding commer-
cial partners to transact with in markets and the costs of ac-
tively shunning those who have been shamed increase with the 
size of the (sub) population that has been shamed.146 
These conclusions suggest that shaming penalties have 
built-in limitations and can become self-destructive because ex-
tensive use of the penalties can erode their effectiveness to de-
ter criminal acts. Hence, this theoretical model demonstrates 
that shame has its own limits. Any attempts to limit shame 
further, however, can be difficult. A recent experimental study 
found that social emotions like shame are necessary to prevent 
retaliation by those who are punished and for the viability of 
punishment as an effective method of enforcing social norms of 
cooperative behavior.147  
 
lyzing the hedonic treadmill hypothesis).  
  141. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 273. 
  142. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shame: Why More 
Shaming May Deter Less (Aug. 24, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789244. 
  143. See  id. at 2. 
  144. See id. 
  145. See  id. 
  146. See  id. 
  147.  Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emotions for 
the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (Univ. of Amsterdam & Tinbergen Inst., 
Discussion Paper TI2005-075/1, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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C. ELIMINATING SHAME FROM THE LAW 
As Nussbaum correctly points out, people can misdirect 
shame at specific groups of people such as homosexuals and in-
dividuals with disabilities.148 However, the possibility that cer-
tain members of society may choose to direct shame at those 
groups does not mean that they necessarily will do so. Being 
justifiably concerned with and upset about misdirection of 
shame does not mean that we can purge shame from our legal 
system even if we so desire. 
It is as unlikely that a society will successfully implement 
a “shame about shame” campaign as it is that a society will 
successfully implement a “disgust with disgust” program. 
Nussbaum suggests that “shame is likely to be normatively un-
reliable in public life, despite its potential for good.”149 Indeed, 
she believes “that a liberal society has particular reasons to in-
hibit shame and to protect its citizens from shaming.”150 But it 
will be difficult for a society to limit shame because shame 
naturally attaches for most noncriminals to most acts which 
are deemed to be criminal.151 Criminality and shame are psy-
chologically linked for most noncriminals because of social 
norms against criminality. Society is likely to attach greater 
stigma to criminal acts than noncriminal acts, such as adminis-
trative offenses, civil violations, or regulatory infractions.152 
People will naturally associate different levels of stigma with 
differences in legal procedures, and in particular, the legally 
required standards of proof which attach to alternative wrongs 
and their associated punishments.153 
IV.  POSITIVE ROLES FOR (POSITIVE) EMOTIONS  
IN (LEGAL) DECISION MAKING 
Emotions can play positive roles in the law. There is a 
large body of research about how to reliably distinguish be-
 
  148. See,  e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006). 
 149. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 15. 
  150. Id. 
 151. See Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma out of Admin-
istrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs (July 7, 2005)   
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=738403. 
  152. See  id. 
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tween positive and negative affective states.154 Examples of 
negative emotions are disgust and shame. Examples of positive 
emotions include awe155 or elevation.156 
A. POSITIVE EMOTIONS 
Positive psychology,157 a recent brainchild of Professor 
Martin E.P. Seligman,158 focuses on positive emotions in gen-
eral and on human strengths and virtues in particular,159 in-
stead of the absence of diseases and illnesses. A robust finding 
of positive psychology is that positive emotions improve aspects 
of decision making generally160 and have an especially pro-
nounced effect on complex decisions.161 A few legal scholars 
 
  154. See  DAVID  WATSON,  MOOD AND TEMPERAMENT  (2000)  (providing a 
comprehensive review and synthesis of this research and clinical literature). 
  155. See  generally Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, a 
Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic Emotion, 17 COGNITION & EMOTION 297 (2003) 
(presenting a summary of awe research and a conceptual approach to awe). 
 156. Jonathan  Haidt,  The Positive Emotion of Elevation, PREVENTION & 
TREATMENT, Mar. 7, 2000, http://content.apa.org/journals/pre/3/1/3c.html. 
  157. See,  e.g., Shelly L. Gable & Jonathan Haidt, What (and Why) Is Posi-
tive Psychology?, 9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 103 (2005); Martin E.P. Seligman & 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Positive Psychology: An Introduction, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2000). 
  158. See  generally MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING 
THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING 
FULFILLMENT  (2002) (describing the positive psychology movement and its 
practical application). 
  159. See,  e.g., ALAN CARR, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF HAPPI-
NESS AND HUMAN STRENGTHS (2004); CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A 
HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (Christopher Peterson & Martin E.P. Selig-
man eds., 2004). 
  160. See Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive 
Psychology: The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions, 56 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 218, 221 (2001); Barbara L. Fredrickson, What Good Are Positive 
Emotions?, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 300, 308–11 (1998); Barbara L. Fredrickson 
et al., What Good Are Positive Emotions in Crises?: A Prospective Study of Re-
silience and Emotions Following the Terrorist Attacks on the United States on 
September 11th, 2001, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 365, 366 (2003); 
Barbara L. Fredrickson, Cultivating Positive Emotions to Optimize Health and 
Well-Being, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Mar. 7, 2000, http://content 
.apa.org/journals/pre/3/1/1a.html; Sonja Lyubomirsky, On Studying Positive 
Emotions, PREVENTION & TREATMENT,  Mar. 7, 2000, http://content.apa.org/ 
journals/pre/3/1/5c.html.  
  161. See  Alice M. Isen, An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making 
in Complex Situations: Theoretical Issues with Practical Implications, 11 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 75, 78–80 (2001); Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Deci-
sion Making,  in H ANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS  417, 426–27 (Michael Lewis & 
Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000); Alice M. Isen et al., The Influ-
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have analyzed the roles that positive emotions such as empathy 
and sympathy play in law.162 
Positive psychology addresses what makes a happy and 
fulfilling life from a number of perspectives.163 There is evi-
dence from neuroscientific experiments,164 positive psychol-
ogy,165 and psychological research,166 that certain Buddhist 
meditative practices foster well-being. Recent experimental re-
search focuses on interventions and techniques to increase and 
sustain individual happiness.167 For instance, several measures 
of psychological and physical well-being increased markedly in 
two weeks for randomly assigned subjects who kept daily dia-
ries of events they were grateful for, in comparison with ran-
domly assigned individuals who kept diaries of hassles, neutral 
life events, or social comparison.168 Other recent empirical re-
search examines the health benefits derived from experiencing 
positive emotions.169 
An example of the implications that positive psychology 
has for lawyers comes from an article coauthored by Professor 
Seligman, which suggests three main reasons for lawyers’ un-
happiness: pessimism, high-pressure job environments with 
 
221, 221–22 (1991). 
  162. See,  e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psy-
chological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, 
Legal Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2099 (1989); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Con-
frontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988). 
  163. See  generally WILLIAM C. COMPTON, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE PSY-
CHOLOGY (2005) (providing an overview of positive psychology and the role of 
emotions). 
  164. See,  e.g., Marcia Barinaga, Buddhism and Neuroscience: Studying the 
Well-Trained Mind, 302 SCIENCE 44, 45–46 (2003); Richard J. Davidson et al., 
Alterations in Brain and Immune Function Produced by Mindfulness Medita-
tion, 65 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 564, 569 (2003). 
  165. See,  e.g., MARVIN LEVINE, THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF BUDDHISM 
AND YOGA: PATHS TO A MATURE HAPPINESS (2000). 
  166. See,  e.g., Paul Ekman et al., Buddhist and Psychological Perspectives 
on Emotions and Well-Being, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 59, 60 
(2005). 
  167. See,  e.g., Sonja Lyubomirsky et al., Pursuing Happiness: The Architec-
ture of Sustainable Change, 9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 111 (2005). 
  168. See Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough, Counting Blessings 
Versus Burdens: An Experimental Investigation of Gratitude and Subjective 
Well-Being in Daily Life, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377, 386 
(2003). 
  169. See,  e.g., Andrew Steptoe et al., Positive Affect and Health-Related 
Neuroendocrine, Cardiovascular, and Inflammatory Processes, 102 PROC. 
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low decision latitude, and adversarial litigation being zero-
sum.170 Seligman proposes a number of possible ways to in-
crease lawyers’ happiness, including changing law-firm cul-
ture,171 engaging in “cooperative” litigation,172 and reforming 
legal education.173  
Another example of the way positive emotions work to 
shape law and public policy can be found in the economic re-
consideration of paternalism, which is informed by empirical 
and experimental findings about happiness from neurosci-
ence174 and psychology.175 Final examples of positive emotions 
shaping public policy are a consideration of positive emotions in 
populations,176 and a set of new proposals and empirical meth-
ods to measure societal happiness.177 King Jigme Singye Wang-
chuck, who by all accounts is an enlightened monarch of the 
Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, decreed his country’s official 
goal to be the pursuit of its gross national happiness, instead of 
gross national product.178 Governments can utilize these self-
reported measures of subjective well-being to evaluate how 
public policies affect social well-being.179 Such survey data can 
 
  170.  Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 33, 39–42, 46–49 (2001); see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, 
Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Pro-
fession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 888–906 (1999). 
  171.  Seligman et al., supra note 170, at 43–46. 
  172. Id. at 50–51. 
  173. Id. at 51–53. 
  174. See Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience 
and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2006) (proposing that 
mild forms of paternalism are justified if there is a gap between what people 
want and what people like). 
  175. See Peter H. Huang, Happiness and Law: Hedonics, Positive Psychol-
ogy, Affective Neuroscience and Paternalism (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
  176. See Felicia A. Huppert, Positive Mental Health in Individuals and 
Populations, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 307 (Felicia A. Huppert et al. 
eds., 2005). 
  177. See Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a 
Proposal for a National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34 (2000); Daniel Kah-
neman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The 
Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl.1, 1779 fig.3 (2004); 
Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 429 (2004). 
 178. Lynn  Sherr,  Gross National Happiness?: Himalayan Kingdom of Bhu-
tan Favors Contentment Over Commerce, ABC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/2020/International/story?id=1296605. 
  179.  Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Stan-
dard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161, 161 (2005). HUANG & ANDERSON_3FMT 03/13/2006 02:29:43 PM 
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also help regulators analyze the affective or emotional impacts 
of proposed rules.180 
B. NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 
One can view the interplay between emotions and law 
through a lens or perspective different from that of positive 
psychology—namely through an analysis of how negative, un-
pleasant emotions can play beneficial roles in legal decision 
making. As Nussbaum observes, emotions are primary sources 
of meaning for most people.181 Nussbaum points out that some 
people would argue “that the law is based on reason and not 
passion—a view recently imputed to Aristotle in the fictional 
Harvard Law School classroom in the movie Legally Blond.”182 
We feel it is sensible for people to prefer a legal system that 
takes their emotional sources of meaning into account. Thus, 
although we agree with Nussbaum that negative emotions such 
as disgust might easily be abused, we believe that many people 
would perceive a system of law that ignores disgust as being 
inefficient.  
In a worst case scenario, in which a society provides no le-
gitimate outlet through which people can channel their feelings 
of disgust, people may turn to vigilantism to punish behaviors 
or identities that they find to be reprehensible. What is 
needed—perhaps even more than a legal system that elimi-
nates the negative role of disgust or other emotions—is a legal 
system that takes seriously the emotions of persons and 
groups, and explicitly considers the contexts in which any emo-
tion could be considered relevant or beneficial in contributing 
information to a legal decision. Law does not need to eliminate 
every role of disgust within itself (were this possible), nor does 
it need to try to inculcate in a population an avoidance of dis-
gust. Law could play the positive role of delineating the types of 
disgust that are relevant to the law by distinguishing between 
that disgust that is related to punishable wrongdoing, and 
those essentially mistaken, legally irrelevant targets of disgust. 
 
  180.  Peter H. Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regula-
tion: Process Concerns and Emotional Impact Analysis (Feb. 2006) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author), http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/ 
papers/econpaper62.pdf; Peter H. Huang, Happiness and Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis: Evaluating Policy Affect (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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  182. Id.  at 5. HUANG & ANDERSON_3FMT 03/13/2006 02:29:43 PM 
2006]  EMOTIONAL LEGAL DECISION MAKING  1071 
 
Ideally the law would have a clear and robust rationale for do-
ing so. In this type of process, a legal system would play a role 
of protecting minority groups from disgust-related offenses or 
even disgust-related legal prejudices, without providing others 
the sense that that they have to operate outside the legal sys-
tem because it never considers their strong feelings to be rele-
vant. 
CONCLUSION 
Hiding from Humanity provides a provocative and stimu-
lating discussion by a prominent American legal philosopher of 
her viewpoint as to why disgust and shame can and should play 
minimal roles in law. However, other scholars and their disci-
plines also have much to contribute to a more complete and nu-
anced understanding of these two emotions and their norma-
tive legal status. We believe that disgust and shame are likely 
to remain active for some time as part of our legal system and 
its legal analysis. As Nussbaum states, her vision “in effect, is 
something that I do not expect we shall ever fully achieve: a so-
ciety that acknowledges its own humanity, and neither hides us 
from it nor it from us.”183 It is uncertain if we can ever achieve 
such a utopian society. In the meantime, ours is an exciting 
time for scholars of law and emotions because there remain 
many unanswered conceptual, empirical, experimental, and 
theoretical questions about how to incorporate affect, emotions, 
and moods into legal analysis, policy, practice, and theory. 
 
 
  183. Id. at 17. 